NKVD Gas Vans: Myth or Reality?

Gas vans are trucks equipped with a mobile gas chamber, most commonly used for murder. They are well-known for their well-documented usage by Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. 

That said, there are allegations that the NKVD used gas vans during the Great Purge. Wikipedia claims:

During the Great Purge, Soviet NKVD used gas vans for killing prisoners.[1] 

But is this actually true? Did the NKVD really use gas vans during the Great Purge? This post will be examining the claims of NKVD gas van usage.

Sources on gas vans

Isai Davidovich Berg (1905-1939) was an NKVD officer responsible for executions at Butovo firing range between December 1937 and August 1938. 

Berg was arrested on 4 August, 1938, and he was interrogated by an NKVD officer named Titelman from the day of his arrest. Until December, none of his interrogation protocols were recorded (keep this in mind). Titelmen was soon arrested and Berg's new interrogator was Safranov, who allegedly beat Berg multiple times[2]. Berg was charged with participating in a counter-revolutionary organization and being a part of an armed insurrection, and shot on 7 March 1939. Now, how is this relevant to gas vans?

Testimony of former NKVD investigator Nikolai Kharitonov

According to Kharitonov, Berg was responsible for murder by gassing of prisoners at Butovo. He testified this in a rehibilitation hearing in 1956.

When it came to Berg's participation in a conspiratorial counter-revolutionary organization, I had my doubts. But at the same time from Berg's case files and from the talks among the UNKVD MO co-workers, as well as from Berg's confessions I formed an opinion that he was one of the organizers and practical performers of the grossest violations of the socialist law [...] With his participation certain vehicles were created, the so-called dushegubki [gas vans]. In these vehicles the prisoners, those sentenced to death penalty, were transported to the place of execution and on the way were poisoned with gas... I think Berg himself admitted it during the investigation.  

Question to Kharitonov: What you have told about dushegubki cannot be seen in the case files. How can you explain this? 

Answer: As far as I remember, in the interrogation protocols of Berg the facts of the violation of the socialist law were represented, also recorded was his testimony about asphyxiation with gas of those sentenced to death. I remember that during one interrogation Berg admitted to having implemented the executions with the help of a car (dushegubka), explaining that he was following the orders of the UNKVD MO leadership and that without this it was impossible to implement so many shootings of prisoners who had been sentenced by three troikas at once. From the stories [that came up] during Berg's interrogations and from the talks among the UNKVD MO co-workers it was known that the execution procedure organized by Berg was ghoulish: the prisoners sentenced to death were completely undressed, tied, gagged and thrown into the car. Their property was being stolen under Berg's guidance.[3]

The problem with Kharitonov's testimony is that it's hearsay; the protocols of Berg's interrogation in 1938 no longer exist, so there is no way of proving beyond this testimony that Berg actually admitted to using gas vans. 

However, just because the testimony is hearsay doesn't mean it isn't historically valuable; while direct eyewitness testimonies are stronger than hearsay reports, hearsay reports are still not totally worthless in history. This is especially the case when Kharitonov had no reason to lie.

Furthermore, if Berg did confess to this, the fact of him being tortured during his interrogation does not mean that his testimony is false. This is for 2 reasons; first off, Berg was not sentenced for using gas vans, he was sentenced for alleged counter-revolutionary activities. Secondly, and most importantly, the Soviets never forced people to confess about using gas vans of all things. They forced people to confess about claims of things like sabotage, wrecking, Trotskyism, being a foreign agent, etc; never gas vans. So if Berg did confess to this as Kharitonov claimed, he was probably telling the truth.

Testimony of Fjodor Tchesnokov

Three members of Berg's execution team were interviewed on gas vans. Witnesses Viktorov and Shinin both denied the existence of gas vans. However, witness Fjodor Tchesnokov affirmed their existence.

I know that special cars were made in order to transport prisoners to the place of execution. These cars were fitted with special plugs with the help of which one could let the gas into the body of the car. It was done for safety reasons during the transportation of prisoners to the place of execution, that is, in case of a riot in the car. Whether this method was used for pacification of the prisoners is not known to me.[4]

The problem with Tchesnokov's testimony is that it's vague; it doesn't specifically state that gas vans were used for murder. Nevertheless, it agrees that there were gas vans at Butovo firing range. And the fact that Tchesnokov was both an eyewitness and had no reason to lie about gas vans shows that his testimony is historically trustworthy, though it cannot be used in support of MURDER by gas vans, only their existence. 

Archaeology of Butovo

Tomas Kizny points to archaeological excavations at Butovo showing that, of 59 corpses exhumed, only 4 were shot in the head. He therefore concludes that at least some of these corpses were gassed.[5]

Conclusion

While both testimonies are not strong evidence alone - one being hearsay and the other being vague about murder - they are both still independent sources that corroborate eachother. They both agree that there were gas vans (whether they were used for murder or not) at Butovo firing range. Neither men had any reason to lie. The archaeology of some of the corpses at Butovo also can't be ignored.

Therefore, I conclude that there was (MOST LIKELY) limited use of gas vans at Butovo by Berg for murder. It's not 100% certain, but from a historical standpoint, it is most likely true. 

But ONLY at Butovo. Holocaust deniers have made somewhat of a big deal about Soviet gas vans, with our very favorite civil debater, Fritz Berg, saying:

More than likely, the Soviet allegations of gas trucks are truly based on the Soviets' own mass murder technology to which they simply added Diesel engines to make them seem more sinister and, most of all, more German.[6]

This is just ridiculous. The evidence is completely insufficient to claim that use of gas vans was WIDESPREAD among the NKVD. There are no documents about gas vans, nor are there any direct eyewitness testimonies describing murder. The evidence barely exists to even declare Soviet gas vans a historical fact (but it nevertheless exists). 

This is especially true in the fact that Fritz cited a TV documentary where a former KGB officer says that gas vans were used at Butovo by Isai Berg. To him, one statement by a guy in a TV documentary is enough evidence to prove that Soviet gas vans not only existed but were widespread. Yet he ignores the overwhelming evidence proving that Nazi gas vans were used during the Holocaust beyond any doubt. Sergey Romanov excellently exposed the ridiculous hypocrisy of deniers on gas vans in one of his blog posts. 

Sources

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas_van

[2]: http://holocaustcontroversies.blogspot.com/2016/01/a-study-in-hypocrisy-revisionist.html

[3]: История Бутовского Полигона. 1934–1936. Часть 2. - История - АРХИВ - Русская Стратегия, http://rys-strategia.ru/publ/1-1-0-211.

[4]: Ibid

[5]: Tomasz Kizny, Dominique Roynette. La grande terreur en URSS 1937–1938. Lausanne: Éd. Noir sur Blanc, 2013, p. 236.

[6]: Friedrich Berg, ‘The Diesel Gas Chambers: Myth within a Myth,’ in G. Rudolf (ed.), Dissecting the Holocaust, pp.435-469; this is an updated and slightly expanded version of Berg’s original article, ‘The Diesel Gas Chambers – Myth Within a Myth,’ The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 5 No. 1 (1984), pp.15-46.

Iordan Terziev's horrifying testimony of NKVD torture

Iordan Terziev (aka Yardon Atanasov) was a Bulgarian politician, born in 1900. He was in the Communist Party of Bulgaria from 1922-1926, and later in the Communist Party of Argentina. He emigrated to the USSR in 1930, and attended the Institute of Red Professors until 1936. Then, apparently being sent - along with Ivan Piperkov and Piotr Stanev - by Yezhov personally, he was professor in the Agrarian Institute in Ashkabad, Turkmenistan. On February 6, 1938, he was arrested, and repeatedly urged to confess during his interrogation, until his case was closed and he was released on April 25, 1939.

This is his testimony of what happened to him, in a letter to the leader of the Comintern of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

What you are about to read is, in my opinion, one of the most horrifying accounts of NKVD interrogation during the Great Purge. That said, here is the letter:

Letter from I. Terziev to Dimitrov and Kolarov describing his arrest and the methods of investigation.

 

To the leader of the Comintern and the Bulgarian Communist Party

-- Georgy Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov.

From Terziev, I. T. (Yanko Atanasov).

Dear comrades,

On 6 February 1938, I was arrested for no reason by NKVD organs and, after spending 15 months in the Ashkhabad prison, was released on 25 April 1939. After my release, I learned that almost all of the Bulgarian émigrés had been arrested and were still held in prisons and camps. I do not know whether you are aware of all the reasons that led the [Bulgarian] émigrés to this tragic situation, therefore I will tell you everything that happened to me. Because, even if it is not typical for all the arrested émigrés, it is typical for the comrades whom I got to know during the investigation: those comrades who are still [being held] in prisons and camps.

In Ashkhabad (Turkmenia), I worked along with Ivan Piperkov and Piotr Stanev. We were instructors in the CC of the Communist Party of Turkmenia, sent personally by Ezhov. Georgy Tsanev worked as a woodworker, and I [worked] as a head of section of the social sciences in an institute. I was sent there in accordance with a directive of the CC VKP(b), which was signed personally by A. A. Andreev.

Our party papers and travel documents indicated that we were important party members. However, in early November 1937, Iv. Piperkov and Georgy Tsanov were arrested. 20 days later, Piotr Stanev was also arrested. Immediately after their arrest, I wrote to the section, via c. Anton Ivanov, describing everything that had happened and, a month after their arrest, I went to the Turkmenian NKVD to inquire about the reasons for arresting the comrades in question. I was received by an investigator named Erastenko, to whom I described all the activities of the comrades in Bulgaria and expressed my opinion that the NKVD made a mistake by arresting them. In addition, I presented written references for the comrades with whom I worked in Bulgaria, and declared that I was only fulfilling my party duty and wanted to assist the organs in clarifying the question of Bulgarians in Turkmenia. Erastenko told me that I was vouching for them in vain, since they had already confessed of espionage…

Soon after that, I was also arrested and sent to the Ashkhabad prison. There I met many party activists, soldiers, doctors, etc. When I said that I was Bulgarian, those arrested told me: “You, com. Terziev, will be a Bulgarian spy, and, if you want to save your skin, [you have to] recruit as many accessories as you can and confess immediately. Otherwise, you are dead.” The slogan “recruit as many as you can” was promoted by the Turkmenian Trotskyists, in particular by the old Trotskyist Rubinstein, a member of the CC of the party, and the director of a chemical plant in Kara-Bugas, Tol. Around this slogan, a sharp ideological struggle went on between the Trotskyists and the loyal party members. Using this slogan, the Trotskyists managed to deliver a heavy blow both to the party and the NKVD, since many of the arrested gave in to this provocation, and especially to the prosecutors. As a result of this provocation, one arrested [person] dragged down with him dozens of innocent and honest party members and non-party Bolsheviks. I simply can not describe this issue more specifically, but I urge you to pay  special attention to it, because the roots of the problem are in Moscow -- this slogan was implemented in an organized manner everywhere.

My case was investigated by Lieutenant Kovalevsky. On 9 February, he called me in for interrogation. His first question was, “By whom, when and how were you recruited [to work] for foreign intelligence?” Then he continued: “The prosecution possesses reliable information that you are the IKR spy. Confess by yourself, because voluntary confession will lighten your penalty. Your fate was sealed before your arrest, and keep in mind that, if you do not confess, you will be shot.” I told him that I had no idea about this work. He then made me sit on a “stool,” on which it was absolutely impossible to sit. I spent three days, without being able to move, on this stool; my limbs swelled, I felt particularly strong, dull pains in my legs. Along with the physical suffering, I was insulted with refined obscenities. Not only was my honor as a communist and a man outraged, but also the honor of my deceased parents. On 13. II-39, they started beating me. I was beaten by the investigator Kovalevsky and his assistant who, in addition to regular beatings, struck me several times in the back of my head. I do not remember what they did to me afterwards, but when I recovered, I felt a strong pain in the eyes. As a result of the shock, my eyes hemorraged. At present, the treatment can only localize the disease, but, as doctors told me, I will never regain normal sight.

After these physical and moral treatments, and after a long “rest,” the investigator again summoned me to an interrogation and subjected me to new tortures. [I] was standing on my knees with hands raised up, while the investigator opened a book and read a number of Bulgarian names, of which I remember Grancharov, Dr. Maksimov, Novakov, Nikolov, etc. He characterized them as Trotskyists and asked if I knew them. I answered that I knew them as loyal communists. After that I was beaten again.

It is hard to describe what I lived through in those days, but I felt that I was fading away, that I would die in a NKVD dungeon. A person commits suicide only under extreme psychological conditions, which I reached twice. However, the investigators must have been watching my feelings and intentions. They used to guard me particularly closely, so I could not approach the window or the stairs. I decided to break my head against the wall, but when I started doing it, I was caught by two investigators. They must have been frightened by my terrible act and started to calm me down saying that I should not torment myself, that there was a way out, I only had to agree to write something. I objected saying indicating that I could not invent crimes and attribute them to myself because that would mean misleading the party and the government and thus actually help the enemies. Kovalevsky told me several times: “Regarding the truthfulness of the testimony, we warn only the witnesses. But you have to provide the testimony of a spy, remember that.”

I could not stand on my knees anymore, and I asked [them] to give me some rest, after which I would testify. With a bloody head and tormented body, I was returned to the prison [cell] for a rest. After several hours, I was again taken for interrogation. I decided to ruin myself, but not to permit additional victims, and, if I could not hold this line, to mention comrades who were not in the Soviet Union or who had already been arrested.

I started to write a confession that I was an agent of French intelligence, but my investigator, after having read it, told me that it was no good, that I had to write something more intelligent if I wanted to avoid tortures.

They made me stand on my knees again, however this time, they put six-sided pencils under my knees. One can only stand [the pain] for a maximum of 4-5 hours, after which he passes out. After this procedure, the following day I became a German spy. My confession, in short, consisted of the following:

I supposedly had met, through one comrade, a woman who, in turn, led me to a worker in the German embassy, to whom: 1) I provided information about the political émigrés [and] the moods among them, about who was coming to the USSR and who was going back; 2) On his orders, following special plans, I prepared to sabotage factories in case of a war. In this confession, I included, as the members of the espionage group, Dustabanov, Kiskinov and Iv. Sterev. In late February, I signed the final examination record. However, the next day, during the night I was brought [back] to my investigator and the head of the NKVD’s III department, [a man] named Bolshakov, who started to swear at me and said: “We will liquidate all of you political émigrés.” He was dissatisfied with my confession because I recruited too few people. He ordered the physical tortures to continue. Then I declared to him that being a foreigner, I can give valuable testimony, but for several reasons, could only do so before the Narkom, and they, in the interests of investigation, would have to let me see him. He agreed.

Three or four days after this conversation, in early March, I was called for questioning. My investigator repeated again a series of physical tortures, this time in a more disgusting form. I could not stand it, and started to write new confession, this time as an agent of Bulgarian counterintelligence. I decided to involve in the espionage organization people who had been compromised in the movement, or those representing no special interest [to the movement]. My confession can be reduced to the following: 1) That in 1925, Dustabanov accidentally introduced me to P. Topalov, to whom I expressed my disillusionment with the revolution. Topalov promised me rehabilitation by the Bulgarian government if I agreed to provide information about the émigrés. 2) [That] Topalov and I supposedly named those émigrés  who returned to Bulgaria and who later were shot by the Bulgarian government. 3) That we engaged in provocation in Constantinopole throughout the whole period. 4) That, through Todor Lukanov and Georgy Popov, we conducted sabotage activities in the Narkomvneshtorg and in Tsentrosoiuz. 5) That Topalov and I stole some central archive [Tsentro-Arkhiv] documents that compromised a number of bourgeois parties in Bulgaria.

I signed this confession on 21. III-38. In early April 1938, I was again interrogated and made sign a new examination record which included, besides those first records, the following paragraphs:

1) That I was supposedly connected with the Popov-Tanev group, and that I rehabilitated them in the émigré circles, and that we supposedly carried on a struggle against c.c. G. Dimitrov and V. Kolarov.

2) That Topalov supposedly told me that the Plenipotentiary Minister in Moscow, Antonov, was connected with the German counterintelligence.

Having signed this confession, I waited every night for 5 months for them to shoot me.

I retracted my confession on 20 September 1938 and again on 19 October. The last time, my retraction was documented, and the “conditions” under which this confession was given were noted. I repeated this retraction in front of other investigators.

5 more months passed, and only on 1 April was I summoned for questioning by my first investigator, Kovalevsky. He composed a detailed examination record, refuting the records of 21. III and 5. IV-38. After that I was called 3 times to the military procurator who questioned me in detail about the methods of investigation, and what I knew about the escape from “St. Anastasia.” I answered that c. G. Dimitrov characterized this escape as a CPB affair. On 25. IV-38, I was summoned to a Commission where they asked me who in the Comintern knew me. After that, they told me that I was free and could appeal to the Comintern or CC VKP(b). 

As to the other Ashkhabad comrades, I learned that Georgy Tsanev confessed to being a member of some terrorist group which sought to murder c. G. Dimitrov. He was sentenced to 8 years and exiled.

In October 1938, Professor Dziakovsky from the Med[ical] Institute was transferred to my cell. He told me that Ivan Piperkov had been  subjected to terrible beating. He confessed to being agent provocateur. After he recovered, he was transferred from a common cell to solitary confinement.

On 1 April 1939, during the interrogation, investigator Kovalevsky let me read one page from Iv. Piperkov’s testimony. It said that, in Odessa in 1926, Iv. Piperkov had organized a counterrevolutionary group consisting of Iv. Piperkov, Boyan Atanasov, Vasili Ivanov, Yakim Ivanov, Terziev, V. Novakov, Stoenchev, K. Nikolov, Stareishinsky, Dr. Maksimov and a number of other comrades. I thoroughly refuted that statement in order to rehabilitate comrades. Judging from the investigator’s behavior, I understood that Piperkov was alive.

I could not learn anything specific about Peter Stanev. In prison they said that he he had been shot.

I have described to you, very objectively, the procedures and methods of the investigation of my case. I declare before you that I have never been a member of any oppositional groups, never shared anti-party views, but in spite of this, they attempted to turn me into the enemy of the party and a fascist hero.

The opinion of some comrades who think that the NKVD does not arrest those non-guilty is wrong. In prisons, I met many innocent comrades.

Besides the Boikovtsevs, Zlatorovtsevs and some other types, Bulgarian p[olitical] emigres, and the p[olitical] emigres in the USSR in general, are the victims of a planned and broad provocation undertaken by Trotskyists and [agents of] foreign counterintelligence in the NKVD apparatus. It would be interesting to know about the role played here by the Bulgarian Trotskyists and sectarians, many of whom worked for the NKVD officially or non-officially.

These arrests had as a goal the political degeneration of the émigrés, the compromising of the CC VKP(b) and c. Stalin personally, [as well as of] the Comintern and c. Dimitrov personally. Many of the arrested shared the opinion that everything that was going on in the country was sanctioned by c. c. Stalin and Dimitrov.

In addition, there was created in the party a certain psychosis against foreigners. The word “vigilance” was substituted for “mistrust,” which has nothing to do with the revolutionary vigilance. As a result of this psychosis and the false denunciations, many political émigrés were imprisoned.

Bulgarian political émigrés were educated ideologically in Bulgaria under your direct guidance. Under your guidance, these émigrés offered examples of selflessness and heroism. [Events in] Spain have once again verified the remarkable qualities of Bulgarian communists.

Ideologically, our emigres have never been with the Boikovtsy and Iskrovtsy, except for a few petty-bourgeois types and comrades who incidentally lost their way. The Bulgarian political emigration has a great respect for the party’s past and for its founders.

You have to do everything possible to save the people, because without your active involvement in this question, the émigrés will not be freed and will vanish in the camps. The cadres, which you have been creating for decades, will vanish.

Nalchik,

5. VIII – 1939.

With fraternal greetings,

P. Terziev (Ya. Atanasov).

(Enemies within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939 by William J. Chase, Document 65)

Unfortunately, Terziev's experience is not the only one of torture during the Great Purge, as there is clear evidence of extensive torture by the NKVD. 

One of Stalin's orders for beatings of individuals during the Great Purge

There are at least 2 records in which Stalin orders the torture of specific individuals. I will be discussing one of them here. (The other can be found here).

On 13 September 1937 Stalin gave instructions on multiple issues including arrests and interrogation. In this, he ordered:

Beat Unshlikht because he did not extradite Poland's agents in the regions (Orenburg, Novosibirsk, etc.)[1].

This was an order to beat Iosif Unshlikht , a Soviet government official who was Polish. 

Unshlikht was arrested on 11 June 1937 and accused by Yezhov of being a leader of the (non-existent) Polish Military Organization[2]. 

He was beat and tortured (as evidenced by this document); according to Alexander Yakovlev, "during the interrogations, he withstood all the torture and beatings and refused all charges."[3]. 

Unshlikht was sentenced to death on 28 June 1938, and shot either the same day or on 29 June. He was rehabilitated in 1956[4].

Sources

[1]: https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/61181

[2]: Petrov, Nikita, and Jansen, Marc. Stalin's Loyal Executioner: People's Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895-1940. United States, Hoover Institution Press, 2013. p. 76-77

[3]: See footnote on document of source 1

[4]: http://1937god.info/node/1599

Problems in the "Germans did the Katyn Massacre" Theory; Part 1: Lack of German documents

If the Germans truly did the Katyn Massacre like Katyn revisionists argue, it would be reasonable for there to be contemporary German documents (such as a German Einsatzgruppen report) which discuss the mass murder of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest and the other prison camps.

After all, the Germans documented mass shootings they actually did. 

Take the Babi Yar Massacre as an example of this.

On the 2nd of October, 1941, an activity report of the Reich Security Main Office reported that:

On 29 and 30 September 1941, 33,771 Jews were executed in Kiev by Sonderkommando 4a in collaboration with the group staff and two commandos of  Police Regiment South.

 

(Metzner, Hans. “Evidence on the Babi Yar Massacre 29 & 30 September 1941: Contemporary Sources.”, 6 Mar. 2017, holocaustcontroversies.blogspot.com/2017/03/evidence-on-babi-yar-massacre-29-30.html. Document 7) 

Other German documents related to the Babi Yar Massacre

Another example of German documentation of mass shootings is Operational Situation Report No. 80 by Einsatzgruppe C on 11 September 1941:

...in the course of 3 days 23,600 Jews were shot in Kamenets-Podolsk by a Commando of the Higher SS and Police Leader ["South"]...

 

(https://www.yadvashem.org/untoldstories/database/germanReports.asp?cid=278&site_id=288)

Other German documents related to the Kamenets-Podolsk Massacre 

There is also the infamous Jager Report, a 9 page German document which reports on the mass executions of about 137,000 people (mostly Jews) in the Baltics during Operation Barbarossa.

(I will not be showing pictures of the Jager Report as that would probably make this post too long, but for a source for the Jager Report see https://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/document/DocJager.htm.)

As is clearly demonstrated by the above documents, the Germans documented the mass executions they committed on the Eastern Front.

That being said, how much documentary evidence for the Germans committing the Katyn Massacre is there?

None at all.

There are no reports by the Einsatzgruppen, Waffen-SS, Wehrmacht, or any other Nazi organization about the mass execution of 22,000 Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest, or any of the other prison camps. 

This presents a massive challenge to the "Germans did it" theory. If the Germans truly did commit the massacre, there would be at least 1 document proving that they did.

But, there is none.

Quick note on Goebbels' Quote about the Katyn Massacre

Katyn deniers have cited a quote from Joseph Goebbels in his diary as evidence of a German conspiracy to blame Katyn on the Soviets.

Unfortunately German munitions were found in the graves of Katyn... it is essential that this incident be kept top secret. If it were to come to the knowledge of the enemy the whole Katyn affair would have to be dropped.  

-(Goebbels, p. 354)

So is this evidence that the Germans did the Katyn Massacre and were trying to blame the Soviets for it?

No.

The reason why the above quote is not evidence is simply because Katyn deniers dishonestly omit parts of that quote in the above version of the quote.

Here is the full version of the quote:

Unfortunately German munitions were found in the graves of Katyn. The question of how they got there needs clarification. It is either a case of munitions sold by us during the period of our friendly arrangement with the Soviet Russians, or of the Soviets themselves throwing these munitions into the graves. In any case, it is essential that this incident be kept top secret. If it were to come to the knowledge of the enemy the whole Katyn affair would have to be dropped.    

-(Goebbels, p. 354)

So, in the full version of the quote, Goebbels plainly states that he does not know why there were German munitions in the mass graves at Katyn. 

If the Germans truly did do the Katyn Massacre and Goebbels was involved in the conspiracy to claim the Soviets did it, then he would have known why there were German munitions at the Katyn graves. But, he doesn't. 

This quote is simply not evidence of the Germans being the perpetrators of the Katyn Massacre. If anything, it is evidence of Katyn revisionists omitting information and being dishonest, since various revisionists have used the same version of the quote, which omits important parts of it, as evidence.

Now, Goebells does say that German munitions were found at the Katyn site. However, this is still not evidence that the Germans did the Katyn Massacre.

 

 

Problems in the "Germans did the Katyn Massacre" Theory (Part 1: Introduction)

The Katyn Massacre was the mass execution of about 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia by the Soviet Union in April and May of 1940, during World War 2. The massacre was ordered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on May 5, 1940. 

Mass graves were discovered in the Katyn Forest by the Nazis during their occupation of Smolensk, and the massacres were subsequently dubbed the "Katyn Massacre". However, mass killings also occurred at other prisons such as Kalinin (modern day Tver) and Kharkov. 

A branch of Stalin apologists who call themselves "Katyn revisionists" have claimed that this massacre was not done by the Soviets. They have claimed that this massacre was done by the Germans, and that they lied about it for propaganda purposes. Notable Katyn revisionists include Grover Furr, Yuri Mukhin, and the Stalin Society. The idea that the massacre was committed by the Germans was the official stance of the Soviet government up until 1991. 

Of course, the massacre was done by the Soviets, not the Germans. There are no eyewitness testimonies of the alleged German crime. No German documents or records report on the alleged German crime. And, no German officer at any of the trials confessed to committing the Katyn massacre. There are many other problems in the theory. 

This series will discuss, in detail, the serious problems in the claim that the Germans did the massacre. It will discredit and refute the claim that the Germans did it, and show evidence of Soviet responsibility.

Evidence of Mass Confiscation of Foodstuffs by Stalinist Authorities during the Holodomor; Part 1: Documentary Evidence

During the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine known as the Holodomor, at a time of need where food was scarce, the Soviets engaged in confiscation of foodstuffs from certain households in Ukraine. This is confirmed by both documentary evidence and eyewitness testimonies. 

This post contains documentary evidence of mass confiscation of foodstuffs by the Stalinists. Expect a post with eyewitness testimonies soon, as a part 2.

Contemporary Soviet documents

-Letter from Komsomol member Pastushenko, Polonyste village, Baban raion, Vinnitsa oblast, to Joseph Stalin on 10 February 1932 on the requisition of grain and starving collective farmers (excerpt).

February 10, 1932

Good day honorable secretary of the AUCP(b), Comrade Stalin!

I am writing you this letter from a remote, out-of-the-way village in Ukraine. On a military map you will find the village called Polonyste on the river Yatran in the Uman region of Baban raion. Listen to this, Comrade Stalin! The village of 317 homesteads is collectivized a full one hundred percent. Do you think we have Soviet rule here?

No, it’s not Soviet, but completely bourgeois. Remember serfdom, six days of work for the master, and the seventh was а Sunday, when you didn’t work because it was a holiday? In the village cooperative, we work every day. There is nothing around the homes but empty buildings, yet we still have to pay taxes from our households for work done on the collective farm, and turn over our own savings; if you sign for a loan of 40 karbovantsi at the collective farm then [you must] pay it back from your homestead. It has been three years since everything has been collectivized by the kolhosp, yet we have to turn in grain procurements for land that we contributed to the kolhosp. Don’t go to the kolhosp for bread, but yourself provide 45 poods from three-tenths of a field, pay 28 karbovantsi for a share in the cooperative and pay a construction advance of 15 karbovantsi from your home; all that is left from three years of food are only kopeks of money — such is life.

Our village has fulfilled the [grain procurement] plan by 65 percent. The kolhosp shipped out the last funt of every sort of grain. There is nothing for the horses, only chopped wheat sprinkled with molasses; 56 horses have died already. Everyday three, four, six horses die of starvation; there is not a kernel left. There were 500 pigs, 184 of which have already died, [the remainder] eat sugar beet residue. There are only 60 cows, of which 46 will go for meat, leaving 14 for the entire village for all of 1932. That’s livestock breeding for you. Ours is a beet-growing and cattle-farming region and there are predictions that all the livestock will die in two months. People are beginning to die of famine, to swell and children ask for “bread, bread.” Do no think, Dear Leader, that people have refused to work… or [that there was] a bad harvest that nobody is considering. Last year’s harvest was average and the population barely survived because the plan was 38,000 poods. This year it’s 57,000 poods…

A brigade of 86 persons has spent three months doing nothing [but] check under every house, day after day. Since the campaign began, every house has been searched 60 times. They took the last funt of vegetables from the kolhosp, [leaving] collective farmers with two poods of potatoes per person; the remaining funts went for procurement. There is no provision for spring sowing, not a funt of seed, not a grain crop left: no potatoes, no beans, no legumes, no lentils, no peas, no buckwheat, no cattle grass, no barley, no oats, no soybeans — everything to the last funt. They have taken our beets and pickled cabbage and are taking away our chickens. Villagers say the secret slaughter of rabbits is taking place because there is nothing to eat. Such is the state of affairs, Comrade Stalin. […]

Komsomolets, Branch secretary,

member of RKM bureau

Pastushenko

(https://web.archive.org/web/20180831211853/http://www.faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm#2) 

-Statement (1, 2) on 16 April 1932 of a member of the artel "Red Field" VK Kyrychenko to the Cheremushnyanskaya village council of Valkiv district with a request to return confiscated bag of flour. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=2&doc=33)

-Letter from Vlas Chubar to Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin of 10 June 1932 on agricultural affairs in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (excerpt). 

June 10, 1932

[...] In two trips (with a small break) I spent 15 days in the hardest-hit raions and villages of Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts. I became familiar with the state of affairs in 13 raions of Kyiv oblast (visited four villages) and four raions of Vinnytsia oblast (visited eight villages). I should say that I was unable to collect and check statistics for every raion and village to the same extent. Nevertheless, the main facts in all these raions and villages are similar enough that some general conclusions can be made. What, in fact, has happened to those raions that emerged extraordinarily weakened in the spring (some villages destroyed, in the direct sense)?

The failed harvest of legumes and spring crops in those raions was most likely not considered and the crop shortage was compensated by industrial crops earmarked for state procurement. Along with the general weakness of the state grain procurement plan, caused primarily by lower harvests across Ukraine and colossal losses during harvesting (the result of organizationally- and economically-weak collective farms and utterly inadequate control by the raions and center), a system of requisitioning of all grain, including seed reserves, from private farmers was introduced and everything of value was requisitioned from collective farms. Even if collective farms met the targets set by the procurement plan targets, they were issued an additional second and often third [grain quota target]. In many cases, grain issued to collective farmers as advance payment for work was confiscated by [collectivization] brigades for state grain procurement. As a result, the majority of collective farms in those raions were left without grain, without animal feed concentrate for livestock, without food for the disabled, for teachers, etc. […]

The collective farmers with fewest workdays suffered the most, although initially it seemed only private farmers were deprived of grain. In March and April, there were tens and hundreds of malnourished, starving and swollen people dying from famine in every village; children abandoned by their parents and orphans appeared. Raions and oblasts provided food relief from internal reserves, but growing despair and the psychology of famine resulted in more appeals for help. Under these circumstances the collective farms, Soviet state farms and raions should have launched a broad network of public kitchens to deal with the acute shortage of food products in general, and grain in particular.

Cases of malnutrition and starvation were noted in December and January, both among private farmers (particularly whose farms and belongings were sold for failing to meet grain targets) and among collective farmers, especially those with large families. […]

A few words about the excesses of those in charge of economic campaigns and the violations of revolutionary lawfulness that took place in these raions, and, unquestionably, impacted their economic conditions. They were primarily the following:

1) Orders for sowing were received by the raions that contravened crop rotation [practices]; the raions, in turn, assigned absurd tasks to the kolhosps, ignoring the views and experience of collective farmers and [the rules of] agronomy. They were forced to sow winter crops on stubble-fields, which predictably reduced crop capacity, and so on. As a result in Baban raion, for example, with a capacity of 150 to 200 poods of wheat per hectare, they collected only 60 to 70.

2) Raions were overloaded with work, which disrupted fall sowing and winter plowing. The deep tilling of land for sugar beets led to a drop in crop yields and loss of interest among collective farms. Very few collective farms in these raions had fully prepared their fields for beets by the fall; as a result, [only] 30 to 50 percent was prepared.

3) In the battle for bread, the right to sell the property of malicious non-deliverers of grain (the law of 1929) was abused. Private farmers’ harvests were gathered and threshed on so-called “red threshing floors” with threshed grain delivered to grain collectors. This was followed up by rigid “home” targets which were left unfulfilled and resulted in the forced sale of all property, including buildings, domestic goods and chattel, footwear, clothing, etc. In some villages, 20 percent or more of farms have been sold. Add to this the malicious humiliation of private farmers, the majority of who would have become collective farmers, and that of expelled collective farmers, then it becomes clear why independent farmers have no working animals, land allotments or livestock. Those whose livestock was not sold by way of repressions sold or butchered [their livestock] themselves. Leaderless brigades were on the rampage. Those guilty of excesses were tried, but you cannot try all their deeds with one trial.

In addition to grain procurements, the same methods were applied to potato and, especially, meat procurements. A question arises: Is it not time to abolish the system of sales in fully-collectivized raions (since the tools and means of production have been sold off)?

After such actions, it’s clear why so few village council heads and leading [Party] activists from the previous campaigns are left in local areas. Some were tried and removed, while others ran off on their own. Few raion leaders have survived. The new people have lost their heads under the colossal pressure from a public demanding food and the return of illegally-sold property and improperly-collectivized livestock…

[…] The proper functioning of agriculture has been impaired in the Ukrainian SSR over such a large area that special corrections are required to state grain and meat procurement targets and other agricultural goals; in this regard it will be necessary to address the Central Committee and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars separately.

 

V. Chubar

(Document reproduced in https://holodomor.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/6.HolodomorDocuments-MY.docx.pdf, p. 10-11)

-Statement on 14 June 1932 of the 83-year-old peasant MP Volvach to the Cheremushnyanskaya village council of the Valkiv district with a request to return at least three poods of bread that was confiscated for non-compliance with the second norm of grain supplies. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=3&doc=42)

-Telegram from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the CPC USSR to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and the CPC UkrSSR of 21 June 1932  on ensuring the fulfillment of grain requisitions by collective farms and individual peasant homesteads.

21 June 1932  

Two addresses: Kharkiv, CC CP(B)U, [Stanislav] Kosior  

Copy: CPC, [Vlas] Chubar  

In accordance with the resolution of the CPC and CC of 20 and 21 June, the CPC USSR and the CC AUCP(B) propose that you ensure at all costs: 

First. The delivery, in fulfillment of the annual grain requisition, by collective farms and individual peasant homesteads according to Ukraine’s allocated obligations: 14,500,000 poods in July; 72,400,000 poods in August; 71,200,000 poods in September....  

Second…. No manner of evasion should be allowed under any circumstances for collective farms and individual peasant homesteads with regard to grain procurement or for grain delivery by state farms, or for the delivery schedules established for your region according to the resolutions of 20 and 21 June.  

Molotov, Stalin

-Statement (1, 2)  on 1 July 1932 of a resident of the village of Cherkasy, Lozova GI Tkachenko, to the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee about the illegal confiscation of the house, seeds, sale of property for nothing at the expense of grain supplies and a request to help return the house so that his family would not go hungry. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=3&doc=556)

-Statement (1, 2) on 12 August 1932 of a resident of Cherkasy Lozova Kharkiv suburban strip, widow TT A Muscovite asked the Kharkiv Regional Committee to return a cow, all vegetables, and bread illegally confiscated from her by the Cherkasy Village Council, despite paying all agricultural taxes on time. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=4&doc=531)

-Statement (1, 2) on 29 August 1932 of Manchenkov PG Babich to the Kharkiv Regional Executive Committee with a complaint about the actions of the Manchenkivka village council, which took away, "all cattle, the last bread to the pound, left nothing to feed the family." (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=4&doc=533)

-Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 18 November 1942 on measures to strengthen grain procurement (excerpt). 

November 18, 1932

 

III. On grain procurements from collective farms

 

On collective farm reserves

 

In accordance with the resolution of the CC AUCP (b) stating that “the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan is the highest priority mission for collective farms, Soviet farms, MTS [machine and tractor stations] and private farmers,” the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine expressly points out to all Party organizations in Ukraine that the full performance of grain procurement plans is the principal duty of all collective farms and MTS before the Party and the working class, the highest priority task to which of all other collective farm tasks are subordinate, including the formation of various collective farm reserves: seed grain, fodder, food supplies and others.

In accordance with the above, the CP(b)U CC informs Party organizations that:

1. The mission of Party organizations is the full performance of the grain procurement plans by January 1 and formation of seed reserves by January 15.

2. A ban shall be immediately instituted on any and all natural reserves stored in collective farms that are failing to perform grain procurement plan; these reserves shall be inspected [to determine] their real size, places of storage, individuals responsible for their safekeeping; this matter shall be placed under the direct control of raion executive and Party committees.

3. Raion executive committees shall be authorized to transfer all reserves stored by collective farms that are failing to perform grain procurement plans to the grain procurement reserves.
4. Where sowing seed reserves are concerned, paragraph 3 shall only be implemented upon prior consent of oblast executive committees for each separate collective farm.

The CC CP(b)U considers following these instructions on natural reserves to be exceptionally important and places political responsibility for their correct implementation upon oblast Party committees, foremost upon the first secretaries and the chairmen of executive committees.

 

On in-kind fines and combating abuses in collective farms

 

1. Upon receipt of this decree, the distribution of any in-kind natural [grain] advances to all collective farms failing to perform grain procurement plans shall be discontinued.

2. The return of illegally-distributed grain shall be immediately organized in those collective farms that are failing to perform grain procurement plans and have distributed more than the established quotas designated for public consumption and are engaged in additional distribution of different types of lower grade grains, byproducts, etc.; this grain shall be handed over for the fulfillment of grain procurement plans.

The chairmen of these collective farms (Communists and non-Party members) shall be held responsible for the misappropriation of collective farm grain; incorrectly-distributed grain shall be first seized from the board members and administrative staff of these collective farms (accountants, store-keepers, field workers, etc.).

3. The seizure of grain stolen from collective and Soviet farms during crop harvesting, milling, transportation, storage, etc., by collective and private farmers, especially thieves and loafers without any workdays, and grain reserves, shall be organized immediately in all raions.

In implementing this measure, it is necessary to secure the support of the best collective farmers for working in the fields, milling and other collective farm jobs, without resorting to mass searches of collective and private farmers.

4. In those collective farms failing to perform grain procurement plans, all the grain harvested by collective farmers from their home garden plots shall be counted as their in-kind payment for workdays; any excess grain shall be collected towards grain procurements.

5. Fines shall be levied on those collective farms that permitted the stealing of grain and are maliciously undermining grain procurement plans in the form of additional meat procurement targets: they will supply a 15-month quota of meat from collectivized and privately-owned livestock.  
Fines shall be imposed by raion executive committees upon prior consent of oblast executive committees for each separate case. Furthermore, raion executive committees shall establish deadlines and sizes of fines for each collective farm (within the limits of the 15-month meat quota) according to the conditions in each collective farm.

The collection of fines shall not release collective farms from their duties to fully perform grain procurement plans. If a collective farm takes active measures to fully meet its grain procurement targets by a set date, then a fine may be cancelled upon prior consent of the oblast executive committee. [...]

 

On measures to combat kulak influence in collective farms and village party organizations

 

For the purposes of overcoming kulak resistance and fully performing grain procurement plans, the CC CP(b)U resolves the following:

1. Collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging state grain procurement plans shall be blacklisted.

The following measures shall be imposed upon blacklisted collective farms:

а) Immediate suspension of delivery of goods, cooperative and state trade activities in these villages and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores;

b) Full prohibition of kolhosp trading activities between collective farms, collective and private farmers.

c) Suspension of all crediting activities and a demand for pre-term collection of credits and other financial obligations;

d) Investigation and purging of collective farms in these villages, followed by the removal of counterrevolutionary elements and the organizers of grain-collection disruptions;

e) Oblast executive committees shall blacklist and warn collective farms about being blacklisted by issuing appropriate resolutions. 

Oblast executive committees shall immediately report the collective farms being blacklisted to the CC.

 

IV. On grain procurements from private farmers

 

1. Fines shall be levied on those private farmers who are maliciously undermining grain procurement plans (be they contractual or voluntary obligations) in the form of additional meat procurement target to supply a 15-month quota of meat.

These fines shall be imposed by village executive committees upon prior consent of raion committees in each separate instance. Furthermore, village councils shall establish the deadlines and size of fines for each household within the limits of 15-month meat and one-year potato quotas, depending on the conditions in each farm.

The payment of fines shall not release the farms from their duty to fully perform the grain procurement plan.

If private farmers fully perform grain delivery plans by established deadlines, then the fines may be cancelled by decision of raion executive committees. 

In certain raions (subject to approval by oblast executive committee resolutions) fines may be levied in the amount of a one-year potato quota.

Fines may be doubled in extraordinary circumstances, subject to approval by special resolutions of oblast executive committees.

2. The CC warns all local Party organizations and workers against substituting consolidated work in the battle for grain with the simple administration and wide-scale levying of fines. The purpose of in-kind fines is to ensure full performance of grain procurement plans.

3. To immediately collect seed grain and foodstuff loans given to private farmers by collective farms in their raions without recourse for appeal; in cases where loans issued to private farmers were repaid by collective farms (in Vinnytsia oblast, for example), the loans shall be collected from the private farmers and credited to the collective farms’ grain procurement targets.  

4. Organize brigades consisting of collective farm activists (from a given village or those in the area) from collective farms that have fully performed their grain procurement plans, or are on the verge of doing so, to assist in the full performance of grain procurement plans by the private farming sector.

Organize, by December 1, at least 1,100 of these collective farmer brigades throughout Ukraine, according to the following oblasts and numbers:

Vinnytsia         -200     Kyiv                            -300

Chernihiv        -100     Kharkiv                       -350

Odesa              -  50     Dnipropetrovsk           -  50

Donbas            -  50

5. Private farmers who have conscientiously performed their grain procurement duties, especially those who have done so ahead of schedule, shall be recognized by resolutions of village executive committees, assistance commissions, etc., and shall be included in the grain procurement brigades, assistance commissions and so forth.

6. Kulaks who have failed to deliver grain shall be subject to repressions provided by Article 58 of the Criminal Code, either through judicial or administrative proceedings. [...]

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, p. 22-24)

- Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 24 December 1932 on the mandatory shipment of all collective farm grain reserves, including sowing seed, to complete the grain procurement plan.

To: Secretaries of Party raion and oblast committees, persons deputized by CP(b)U

December 24, 1932

In accordance with the cancellation of the CC CP(b)U resolution from November 18 concerning kolhosp inventories, we propose:

1. All collective farms that failed to perform grain procurement plans have five days to ship, without exception, all kolhosp reserves, including sowing seeds, to fulfill grain procurement quotas.

2. Everyone resisting this measure, including communists, shall be arrested and tried.

3. Warn all collective farm heads that if any hidden reserves, stores and the like are found after the set date, then the chairman, and other guilty parties will be brought before the courts and severely punished. 

4. Order all raion Party council secretaries, chairmen of raion executive committees and persons authorized by oblast committees to deliver this resolution for signing by the heads of collective farms in 24 hours’ time.

Kosior

Stroganov

Alekseiev

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 32)

-Letter from Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 29 December 1932 to oblast and raion Party committees on collecting all available reserves for grain procurement.

December 29, 1932

Raion workers have not yet understood that the #1 priority for grain procurement in those collective farms that have failed to perform their duty before the state is the submission of all available seed, including so-called sowing reserves, towards the grain procurement plan.

Accordingly, the CC AUCP(b) has canceled the CC CP(b)U’s decision from November 18 on non-shipment of seed reserves that had weakened our positions in the battle for grain.

The CC CP(b)U orders those collective farms that have not fulfilled the grain procurement plan to immediately hand over all available reserves, including so-called sowing seed, in the course of five to six days, for the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan.

Towards this end, the CC orders the immediate mobilization of all transport vehicles, working animals, automobiles and tractors. In one day’s time, orders should be issued for the daily provision of the necessary number of horses, including for private farmers.

Any delays in the sending out of reserves will be considered by the CC to be sabotage of grain procurement by raion leaders and will be met with commensurate measures. 

Secretary CC CP(b)U S. Kosior

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 34)

-Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 1 January 1933 on grain procurement in Ukraine (excerpt).

1 January 1933 

The CC CP(B)U and CPC UkrSSR shall widely inform village councils, collective farms, collective farmers, and toiling private farmers that.... 

b) Those collective farms, collective farmers, and private farmers who stubbornly inisst on misappropriating and concealing grain will be subject to the strictest punitive measures provided by the USSR Central Executive Committee resolution of  7 August 1932 “On the safekeeping of property of state enterprises, collective farms, and cooperatives and strengthening public (socialist) property.” 

Secretary, CC AUCP(B), J. Stalin

(Document reproduced in https://holodomor.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/6.HolodomorDocuments-MY.docx.pdf, p. 28)

-Report from the Voroshilov Party committee to the Donetsk oblast committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 4 January 1933 on blacklisting the kolhosp in Horodyshche for the systematic non-performance of grain procurement plans.

January 4, 1933

Horodyshche village is the largest in Voroshylov raion with more than 1,000 farms, mostly staroveri [old believers] for whom farming has always been a supplementary source of income as the overwhelming majority of homesteads have been traditionally engaged in trade. This village was found to host the largest kulak community.

Thus, the political campaign measures in Horodyshche were implemented with great difficulty and encountered active resistance from most of the population. In addition to the malicious sabotage of Soviet government efforts, groups of bandits, horse thieves, and the like used to live and hide in this village during the civil war.

Over the years, the Horodyshche village has never fulfilled grain procurement plans.

The persistent neglect of activities conducted in the village by Party and Soviet authorities, cover-ups and familial relationships with dekulakized village leaders are well-preserved to this day, despite the three-year existence of the collective farm that includes most of the people in the village.

In 1931, the grain procurement plan was 10,000 centners [100 kilograms] for a grain crop sowing area of 4,647 hectares; it was 64 percent performed, whereas the plan for the [entire] raion was performed 105 percent.

The 1932 plan of 6.5 thousand centners was 23.9 percent performed as of January 2.

In the two months since the collective farm has been blacklisted (November and December), 373 centners, or 5.6 percent of the annual plan, were delivered to the state, including 83 centners of re-threshed grain, 63 centners of what was obtained illegally by farmers and 6 centners of stolen [grain]. [. . .]

A thorough investigation revealed that the trade ban did not produce the desired effect, because the population, acting through family members and relatives who work in industry, continued consuming goods from the workers’ cooperative, factory and village outlets.

Agricultural products are being secretly carried away for sale by, mostly to Debaltsevo station. Horodyshche farmers have 365 cows, 62 heifers, 56 horses, 10 pairs of oxen (in addition to small livestock), 100 hectares of home garden plots, 28 hectares of orchards that provide large incomes for these farms through the sale of agricultural products at the stations that are located relatively close by.

The following measures were used:

1. In addition to the closing of village stores and Donbastorh [Donbas trade network], strict and closed-list distribution of goods was introduced to the coal miners’ and collective farm workers’ cooperatives. One thousand and twenty family members of collective and private farmers engaged in industrial production were taken off the supply list.

2. Credits in the amount of 23,547 rubles were collected ahead of their scheduled repayment.

3. Three MTS [machine tractor station] tractors were seized from the collective farm.

4. An investigation into collective farm personnel was conducted resulting in the purging of 58 persons (3 kulaks, 22 kulak relatives, 32 thieves, slackers, speculators and kulak supporters). This group, which sought to demoralize the collective farm and organized resistance, was expelled at a meeting of collective farm worker teams with the support of the collective farm majority.

5. Forty-three kulak families that had fled their previous place of residence in Horodyshche were returned to the kulak settlement in the raion.

6. The leadership of the collective farm was put on trial. The investigation uncovered serious abuses. The case is now before the oblast court, where it was submitted on December 23. No response has thus far been received.

7. The collective farm’s sowing seed reserves of 356 centners were requisitioned for the grain procurement campaign.

All these measures were implemented in combination with organized work with the public and the participation of the best the collective farm activists in the grain procurement campaign.

A city Party committee team of 10 leading raion activists is working in the collective farm.

In order to deliver a decisive blow to chronic sabotage by kulaks in Horodyshche, we ask the Party oblast committee to authorize the following additional repressive measures for the Horodyshche village collective farm:

1. Levy 15-month meat quota fines upon collective and private farmers.

2. Assign the best plots of the spare 1,300 hectares of land available to the collective farm to coal-mine food producers, as repressions.

3. Dismiss at least 150 Horodyshche village residents from [industrial] operations for taking active part in the sabotage and derailment of the grain procurement campaign under the guise of industrial laborers after discussing the list of those to be dismissed with collective farm organizations and members.

4. Issue a warning to the collective farm and residents of Horodyshche: If the sabotage of grain procurement and the hiding of stolen grain continue, city organizations will ask the government to resettle saboteurs to the northern oblasts and bring in conscientious collective farmers from city suburbs to take their place; the houses of collective farmers in villages situated near industrial sites will be made available to industrial laborers in need of accommodations.

5. Request the speedy dispatch of oblast court personnel in the case of the Horodyshche collective farm leadership.

Secretary, CP(b)U Voroshylov city committee, Kholokholenko

Commissioner of the oblast committee, Lyrev

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 36-37)

-Act of 1 February 1933 drawn up by the brigade of the Zamistyanska village council of the Valkiv district stating that as a result of a search of a peasant ZA A pit was opened, from which up to 3.5 pounds of rye, up to 2 pounds of beans and up to 2 pounds of dried pears were removed and confiscated. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=2&doc=195)

-Complaint from Hanna Derevinskaya, Krasnopillya, to the Dnipropetrovsk city council of 26 February 1933 about the requisition of food for grain procurement. 

February 26, 1933

To the City Council of Dnipropetrovsk oblast

from Citizen Derevinskaya, Hanna,

Krasnopillya

STATEMENT

Please consider my statement on the unruly work of brigades dispatched by the village council and the representative of the Petrovsky factory.

On February 10, a grain procurement brigade came to me and asked that I voluntarily give what beans I could.  From what I had left to feed the family I gave three kilograms but they took it all (40 kilograms).

On February 23, another brigade made up of the same group came and requested potatoes which I received for labor in workers’ gardens on days off for a family of four which works at the Petrovsky factory; the potatoes received from the cooperative were only for feeding our families. Despite the fact that the potatoes were issued by the state and equally among the other workers who worked in the gardens, including the head of the Petrovsky factory brigade, they did not realize that they’re undermining spring sowing in the workers’ gardens. Acting on their own, they took 125 kilograms of potatoes and 38 kilograms of beets from the cellar. I have fulfilled the entire grain procurement farming quota. I ask your assistance in returning the confiscated food issued by the cooperative.

Appellant Derevinskaya 26.II.1933

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 45)

Contemporary Photographs

-Photograph of Komsomols confiscating grain allegedly hidden by kulaks. (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RIAN_archive_79113_Seizing_grain_from_kulaks.jpg)

-Photograph in November 1932 of Soviet soldiers confiscating large amounts of crops from farmers in Odessa, Ukraine. (https://allthatsinteresting.com/holodomor-ukrainian-famine#7)

-Photograph of a brigade of men with grain confiscated from a nearby house. (https://education.holodomor.ca/educational-resources-list/photo-gallery/historical-photographs-of-the-holodomor-2/)

-Photograph in October 1932 of Soviet authorities confiscating grain from a family in Novokrasne. (http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/24/let-me-take-the-wife-too-when-i-reach-the-cemetery-she-will-be-dead-stories-of-holodomor-survivors/)

-Photograph of Soviet authorities searching for peasant bread. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/gallery.php?pagep=2)

-Photograph of mass grain confiscation in front of a home in the Baryshivka district, Kyiv region. (http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pic%5CG%5CR%5CGrain%20requisition%20in%20Baryshivka%20district%201930.jpg)

-Photograph of a brigade of men searching for "hidden grain". (https://education.holodomor.ca/educational-resources-list/photo-gallery/historical-photographs-of-the-holodomor-2/)