Thursday, January 20, 2022

Problems in the "Germans did the Katyn Massacre" Theory; Part 1: Lack of German documents

If the Germans truly did the Katyn Massacre like Katyn revisionists argue, it would be reasonable for there to be contemporary German documents (such as a German Einsatzgruppen report) which discuss the mass murder of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn forest and the other prison camps.

After all, the Germans documented mass shootings they actually did. 

Take the Babi Yar Massacre as an example of this.

On the 2nd of October, 1941, an activity report of the Reich Security Main Office reported that:

On 29 and 30 September 1941, 33,771 Jews were executed in Kiev by Sonderkommando 4a in collaboration with the group staff and two commandos of  Police Regiment South.

 


(Metzner, Hans. “Evidence on the Babi Yar Massacre 29 & 30 September 1941: Contemporary Sources.”, 6 Mar. 2017, holocaustcontroversies.blogspot.com/2017/03/evidence-on-babi-yar-massacre-29-30.html. Document 7) 

Other German documents related to the Babi Yar Massacre

Another example of German documentation of mass shootings is Operational Situation Report No. 80 by Einsatzgruppe C on 11 September 1941:

...in the course of 3 days 23,600 Jews were shot in Kamenets-Podolsk by a Commando of the Higher SS and Police Leader ["South"]...


 

(https://www.yadvashem.org/untoldstories/database/germanReports.asp?cid=278&site_id=288)

Other German documents related to the Kamenets-Podolsk Massacre 

There is also the infamous Jager Report, a 9 page German document which reports on the mass executions of about 137,000 people (mostly Jews) in the Baltics during Operation Barbarossa.

(I will not be showing pictures of the Jager Report as that would probably make this post too long, but for a source for the Jager Report see https://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/document/DocJager.htm.)


As is clearly demonstrated by the above documents, the Germans documented the mass executions they committed on the Eastern Front.

That being said, how much documentary evidence for the Germans committing the Katyn Massacre is there?

None at all.

There are no reports by the Einsatzgruppen, Waffen-SS, Wehrmacht, or any other Nazi organization about the mass execution of 22,000 Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest, or any of the other prison camps. 

This presents a massive challenge to the "Germans did it" theory. If the Germans truly did commit the massacre, there would be at least 1 document proving that they did.

But, there is none.


Wednesday, January 12, 2022

Quick note on Goebbels' Quote about the Katyn Massacre

Katyn deniers have cited a quote from Joseph Goebbels in his diary as evidence of a German conspiracy to blame Katyn on the Soviets.

Unfortunately German munitions were found in the graves of Katyn... it is essential that this incident be kept top secret. If it were to come to the knowledge of the enemy the whole Katyn affair would have to be dropped.  

-(Goebbels, p. 354)

So is this evidence that the Germans did the Katyn Massacre and were trying to blame the Soviets for it?

No.

The reason why the above quote is not evidence is simply because Katyn deniers dishonestly omit parts of that quote in the above version of the quote.

Here is the full version of the quote:

Unfortunately German munitions were found in the graves of Katyn. The question of how they got there needs clarification. It is either a case of munitions sold by us during the period of our friendly arrangement with the Soviet Russians, or of the Soviets themselves throwing these munitions into the graves. In any case, it is essential that this incident be kept top secret. If it were to come to the knowledge of the enemy the whole Katyn affair would have to be dropped.    

-(Goebbels, p. 354)

So, in the full version of the quote, Goebbels plainly states that he does not know why there were German munitions in the mass graves at Katyn. 

If the Germans truly did do the Katyn Massacre and Goebbels was involved in the conspiracy to claim the Soviets did it, then he would have known why there were German munitions at the Katyn graves. But, he doesn't. 

This quote is simply not evidence of the Germans being the perpetrators of the Katyn Massacre. If anything, it is evidence of Katyn revisionists omitting information and being dishonest, since various revisionists have used the same version of the quote, which omits important parts of it, as evidence.

Now, Goebells does say that German munitions were found at the Katyn site. However, this is still not evidence that the Germans did the Katyn Massacre.



 

 

Sunday, January 9, 2022

Problems in the "Germans did the Katyn Massacre" Theory (Part 1: Introduction)

The Katyn Massacre was the mass execution of about 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia by the Soviet Union in April and May of 1940, during World War 2. The massacre was ordered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on May 5, 1940. 

Mass graves were discovered in the Katyn Forest by the Nazis during their occupation of Smolensk, and the massacres were subsequently dubbed the "Katyn Massacre". However, mass killings also occurred at other prisons such as Kalinin (modern day Tver) and Kharkov. 

A branch of Stalin apologists who call themselves "Katyn revisionists" have claimed that this massacre was not done by the Soviets. They have claimed that this massacre was done by the Germans, and that they lied about it for propaganda purposes. Notable Katyn revisionists include Grover FurrYuri Mukhin, and the Stalin Society. The idea that the massacre was committed by the Germans was the official stance of the Soviet government up until 1991. 

Of course, the massacre was done by the Soviets, not the Germans. There are no eyewitness testimonies of the alleged German crime. No German documents or records report on the alleged German crime. And, no German officer at any of the trials confessed to committing the Katyn massacre. There are many other problems in the theory. 

This series will discuss, in detail, the serious problems in the claim that the Germans did the massacre. It will discredit and refute the claim that the Germans did it, and show evidence of Soviet responsibility.

Saturday, January 8, 2022

Evidence of Mass Confiscation of Foodstuffs by Stalinist Authorities during the Holodomor; Part 1: Documentary Evidence

During the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine known as the Holodomor, at a time of need where food was scarce, the Soviets engaged in confiscation of foodstuffs from certain households in Ukraine. This is confirmed by both documentary evidence and eyewitness testimonies. 

This post contains documentary evidence of mass confiscation of foodstuffs by the Stalinists. Expect a post with eyewitness testimonies soon, as a part 2.

Contemporary Soviet documents

-Letter from Komsomol member Pastushenko, Polonyste village, Baban raion, Vinnitsa oblast, to Joseph Stalin on 10 February 1932 on the requisition of grain and starving collective farmers (excerpt).

February 10, 1932

Good day honorable secretary of the AUCP(b), Comrade Stalin!

I am writing you this letter from a remote, out-of-the-way village in Ukraine. On a military map you will find the village called Polonyste on the river Yatran in the Uman region of Baban raion. Listen to this, Comrade Stalin! The village of 317 homesteads is collectivized a full one hundred percent. Do you think we have Soviet rule here?

No, it’s not Soviet, but completely bourgeois. Remember serfdom, six days of work for the master, and the seventh was а Sunday, when you didn’t work because it was a holiday? In the village cooperative, we work every day. There is nothing around the homes but empty buildings, yet we still have to pay taxes from our households for work done on the collective farm, and turn over our own savings; if you sign for a loan of 40 karbovantsi at the collective farm then [you must] pay it back from your homestead. It has been three years since everything has been collectivized by the kolhosp, yet we have to turn in grain procurements for land that we contributed to the kolhosp. Don’t go to the kolhosp for bread, but yourself provide 45 poods from three-tenths of a field, pay 28 karbovantsi for a share in the cooperative and pay a construction advance of 15 karbovantsi from your home; all that is left from three years of food are only kopeks of money — such is life.

Our village has fulfilled the [grain procurement] plan by 65 percent. The kolhosp shipped out the last funt of every sort of grain. There is nothing for the horses, only chopped wheat sprinkled with molasses; 56 horses have died already. Everyday three, four, six horses die of starvation; there is not a kernel left. There were 500 pigs, 184 of which have already died, [the remainder] eat sugar beet residue. There are only 60 cows, of which 46 will go for meat, leaving 14 for the entire village for all of 1932. That’s livestock breeding for you. Ours is a beet-growing and cattle-farming region and there are predictions that all the livestock will die in two months. People are beginning to die of famine, to swell and children ask for “bread, bread.” Do no think, Dear Leader, that people have refused to work… or [that there was] a bad harvest that nobody is considering. Last year’s harvest was average and the population barely survived because the plan was 38,000 poods. This year it’s 57,000 poods…

A brigade of 86 persons has spent three months doing nothing [but] check under every house, day after day. Since the campaign began, every house has been searched 60 times. They took the last funt of vegetables from the kolhosp, [leaving] collective farmers with two poods of potatoes per person; the remaining funts went for procurement. There is no provision for spring sowing, not a funt of seed, not a grain crop left: no potatoes, no beans, no legumes, no lentils, no peas, no buckwheat, no cattle grass, no barley, no oats, no soybeans — everything to the last funt. They have taken our beets and pickled cabbage and are taking away our chickens. Villagers say the secret slaughter of rabbits is taking place because there is nothing to eat. Such is the state of affairs, Comrade Stalin. […]

Komsomolets, Branch secretary,

member of RKM bureau

Pastushenko


(https://web.archive.org/web/20180831211853/http://www.faminegenocide.com/resources/hdocuments.htm#2) 

-Statement (1, 2) on 16 April 1932 of a member of the artel "Red Field" VK Kyrychenko to the Cheremushnyanskaya village council of Valkiv district with a request to return confiscated bag of flour. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=2&doc=33)

-Letter from Vlas Chubar to Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin of 10 June 1932 on agricultural affairs in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (excerpt). 

June 10, 1932

[...] In two trips (with a small break) I spent 15 days in the hardest-hit raions and villages of Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts. I became familiar with the state of affairs in 13 raions of Kyiv oblast (visited four villages) and four raions of Vinnytsia oblast (visited eight villages). I should say that I was unable to collect and check statistics for every raion and village to the same extent. Nevertheless, the main facts in all these raions and villages are similar enough that some general conclusions can be made. What, in fact, has happened to those raions that emerged extraordinarily weakened in the spring (some villages destroyed, in the direct sense)?

The failed harvest of legumes and spring crops in those raions was most likely not considered and the crop shortage was compensated by industrial crops earmarked for state procurement. Along with the general weakness of the state grain procurement plan, caused primarily by lower harvests across Ukraine and colossal losses during harvesting (the result of organizationally- and economically-weak collective farms and utterly inadequate control by the raions and center), a system of requisitioning of all grain, including seed reserves, from private farmers was introduced and everything of value was requisitioned from collective farms. Even if collective farms met the targets set by the procurement plan targets, they were issued an additional second and often third [grain quota target]. In many cases, grain issued to collective farmers as advance payment for work was confiscated by [collectivization] brigades for state grain procurement. As a result, the majority of collective farms in those raions were left without grain, without animal feed concentrate for livestock, without food for the disabled, for teachers, etc. […]

The collective farmers with fewest workdays suffered the most, although initially it seemed only private farmers were deprived of grain. In March and April, there were tens and hundreds of malnourished, starving and swollen people dying from famine in every village; children abandoned by their parents and orphans appeared. Raions and oblasts provided food relief from internal reserves, but growing despair and the psychology of famine resulted in more appeals for help. Under these circumstances the collective farms, Soviet state farms and raions should have launched a broad network of public kitchens to deal with the acute shortage of food products in general, and grain in particular.

Cases of malnutrition and starvation were noted in December and January, both among private farmers (particularly whose farms and belongings were sold for failing to meet grain targets) and among collective farmers, especially those with large families. […]

A few words about the excesses of those in charge of economic campaigns and the violations of revolutionary lawfulness that took place in these raions, and, unquestionably, impacted their economic conditions. They were primarily the following:

1) Orders for sowing were received by the raions that contravened crop rotation [practices]; the raions, in turn, assigned absurd tasks to the kolhosps, ignoring the views and experience of collective farmers and [the rules of] agronomy. They were forced to sow winter crops on stubble-fields, which predictably reduced crop capacity, and so on. As a result in Baban raion, for example, with a capacity of 150 to 200 poods of wheat per hectare, they collected only 60 to 70.

2) Raions were overloaded with work, which disrupted fall sowing and winter plowing. The deep tilling of land for sugar beets led to a drop in crop yields and loss of interest among collective farms. Very few collective farms in these raions had fully prepared their fields for beets by the fall; as a result, [only] 30 to 50 percent was prepared.

3) In the battle for bread, the right to sell the property of malicious non-deliverers of grain (the law of 1929) was abused. Private farmers’ harvests were gathered and threshed on so-called “red threshing floors” with threshed grain delivered to grain collectors. This was followed up by rigid “home” targets which were left unfulfilled and resulted in the forced sale of all property, including buildings, domestic goods and chattel, footwear, clothing, etc. In some villages, 20 percent or more of farms have been sold. Add to this the malicious humiliation of private farmers, the majority of who would have become collective farmers, and that of expelled collective farmers, then it becomes clear why independent farmers have no working animals, land allotments or livestock. Those whose livestock was not sold by way of repressions sold or butchered [their livestock] themselves. Leaderless brigades were on the rampage. Those guilty of excesses were tried, but you cannot try all their deeds with one trial.

In addition to grain procurements, the same methods were applied to potato and, especially, meat procurements. A question arises: Is it not time to abolish the system of sales in fully-collectivized raions (since the tools and means of production have been sold off)?

After such actions, it’s clear why so few village council heads and leading [Party] activists from the previous campaigns are left in local areas. Some were tried and removed, while others ran off on their own. Few raion leaders have survived. The new people have lost their heads under the colossal pressure from a public demanding food and the return of illegally-sold property and improperly-collectivized livestock…

[…] The proper functioning of agriculture has been impaired in the Ukrainian SSR over such a large area that special corrections are required to state grain and meat procurement targets and other agricultural goals; in this regard it will be necessary to address the Central Committee and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars separately.

 

V. Chubar

(Document reproduced in https://holodomor.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/6.HolodomorDocuments-MY.docx.pdf, p. 10-11)

-Statement on 14 June 1932 of the 83-year-old peasant MP Volvach to the Cheremushnyanskaya village council of the Valkiv district with a request to return at least three poods of bread that was confiscated for non-compliance with the second norm of grain supplies. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=3&doc=42)

-Telegram from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the CPC USSR to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and the CPC UkrSSR of 21 June 1932  on ensuring the fulfillment of grain requisitions by collective farms and individual peasant homesteads.
21 June 1932  
Two addresses: Kharkiv, CC CP(B)U, [Stanislav] Kosior  
Copy: CPC, [Vlas] Chubar  
In accordance with the resolution of the CPC and CC of 20 and 21 June, the CPC USSR and the CC AUCP(B) propose that you ensure at all costs: 
First. The delivery, in fulfillment of the annual grain requisition, by collective farms and individual peasant homesteads according to Ukraine’s allocated obligations: 14,500,000 poods in July; 72,400,000 poods in August; 71,200,000 poods in September....  
Second…. No manner of evasion should be allowed under any circumstances for collective farms and individual peasant homesteads with regard to grain procurement or for grain delivery by state farms, or for the delivery schedules established for your region according to the resolutions of 20 and 21 June.  
Molotov, Stalin

-Statement (12)  on 1 July 1932 of a resident of the village of Cherkasy, Lozova GI Tkachenko, to the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee about the illegal confiscation of the house, seeds, sale of property for nothing at the expense of grain supplies and a request to help return the house so that his family would not go hungry. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=3&doc=556)

-Statement (12) on 12 August 1932 of a resident of Cherkasy Lozova Kharkiv suburban strip, widow TT A Muscovite asked the Kharkiv Regional Committee to return a cow, all vegetables, and bread illegally confiscated from her by the Cherkasy Village Council, despite paying all agricultural taxes on time. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=4&doc=531)

-Statement (12) on 29 August 1932 of Manchenkov PG Babich to the Kharkiv Regional Executive Committee with a complaint about the actions of the Manchenkivka village council, which took away, "all cattle, the last bread to the pound, left nothing to feed the family." (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=4&doc=533)

-Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 18 November 1942 on measures to strengthen grain procurement (excerpt). 

November 18, 1932

 

III. On grain procurements from collective farms

 

On collective farm reserves

 

In accordance with the resolution of the CC AUCP (b) stating that “the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan is the highest priority mission for collective farms, Soviet farms, MTS [machine and tractor stations] and private farmers,” the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine expressly points out to all Party organizations in Ukraine that the full performance of grain procurement plans is the principal duty of all collective farms and MTS before the Party and the working class, the highest priority task to which of all other collective farm tasks are subordinate, including the formation of various collective farm reserves: seed grain, fodder, food supplies and others.

In accordance with the above, the CP(b)U CC informs Party organizations that:

1. The mission of Party organizations is the full performance of the grain procurement plans by January 1 and formation of seed reserves by January 15.

2. A ban shall be immediately instituted on any and all natural reserves stored in collective farms that are failing to perform grain procurement plan; these reserves shall be inspected [to determine] their real size, places of storage, individuals responsible for their safekeeping; this matter shall be placed under the direct control of raion executive and Party committees.

3. Raion executive committees shall be authorized to transfer all reserves stored by collective farms that are failing to perform grain procurement plans to the grain procurement reserves.
4. Where sowing seed reserves are concerned, paragraph 3 shall only be implemented upon prior consent of oblast executive committees for each separate collective farm.

The CC CP(b)U considers following these instructions on natural reserves to be exceptionally important and places political responsibility for their correct implementation upon oblast Party committees, foremost upon the first secretaries and the chairmen of executive committees.

 

On in-kind fines and combating abuses in collective farms

 

1. Upon receipt of this decree, the distribution of any in-kind natural [grain] advances to all collective farms failing to perform grain procurement plans shall be discontinued.

2. The return of illegally-distributed grain shall be immediately organized in those collective farms that are failing to perform grain procurement plans and have distributed more than the established quotas designated for public consumption and are engaged in additional distribution of different types of lower grade grains, byproducts, etc.; this grain shall be handed over for the fulfillment of grain procurement plans.

The chairmen of these collective farms (Communists and non-Party members) shall be held responsible for the misappropriation of collective farm grain; incorrectly-distributed grain shall be first seized from the board members and administrative staff of these collective farms (accountants, store-keepers, field workers, etc.).

3. The seizure of grain stolen from collective and Soviet farms during crop harvesting, milling, transportation, storage, etc., by collective and private farmers, especially thieves and loafers without any workdays, and grain reserves, shall be organized immediately in all raions.

In implementing this measure, it is necessary to secure the support of the best collective farmers for working in the fields, milling and other collective farm jobs, without resorting to mass searches of collective and private farmers.

4. In those collective farms failing to perform grain procurement plans, all the grain harvested by collective farmers from their home garden plots shall be counted as their in-kind payment for workdays; any excess grain shall be collected towards grain procurements.

5. Fines shall be levied on those collective farms that permitted the stealing of grain and are maliciously undermining grain procurement plans in the form of additional meat procurement targets: they will supply a 15-month quota of meat from collectivized and privately-owned livestock.  
Fines shall be imposed by raion executive committees upon prior consent of oblast executive committees for each separate case. Furthermore, raion executive committees shall establish deadlines and sizes of fines for each collective farm (within the limits of the 15-month meat quota) according to the conditions in each collective farm.

The collection of fines shall not release collective farms from their duties to fully perform grain procurement plans. If a collective farm takes active measures to fully meet its grain procurement targets by a set date, then a fine may be cancelled upon prior consent of the oblast executive committee. [...]

 

On measures to combat kulak influence in collective farms and village party organizations

 

For the purposes of overcoming kulak resistance and fully performing grain procurement plans, the CC CP(b)U resolves the following:

1. Collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging state grain procurement plans shall be blacklisted.

The following measures shall be imposed upon blacklisted collective farms:

а) Immediate suspension of delivery of goods, cooperative and state trade activities in these villages and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores;

b) Full prohibition of kolhosp trading activities between collective farms, collective and private farmers.

c) Suspension of all crediting activities and a demand for pre-term collection of credits and other financial obligations;

d) Investigation and purging of collective farms in these villages, followed by the removal of counterrevolutionary elements and the organizers of grain-collection disruptions;

e) Oblast executive committees shall blacklist and warn collective farms about being blacklisted by issuing appropriate resolutions. 

Oblast executive committees shall immediately report the collective farms being blacklisted to the CC.

 

IV. On grain procurements from private farmers

 

1. Fines shall be levied on those private farmers who are maliciously undermining grain procurement plans (be they contractual or voluntary obligations) in the form of additional meat procurement target to supply a 15-month quota of meat.

These fines shall be imposed by village executive committees upon prior consent of raion committees in each separate instance. Furthermore, village councils shall establish the deadlines and size of fines for each household within the limits of 15-month meat and one-year potato quotas, depending on the conditions in each farm.

The payment of fines shall not release the farms from their duty to fully perform the grain procurement plan.

If private farmers fully perform grain delivery plans by established deadlines, then the fines may be cancelled by decision of raion executive committees. 

In certain raions (subject to approval by oblast executive committee resolutions) fines may be levied in the amount of a one-year potato quota.

Fines may be doubled in extraordinary circumstances, subject to approval by special resolutions of oblast executive committees.

2. The CC warns all local Party organizations and workers against substituting consolidated work in the battle for grain with the simple administration and wide-scale levying of fines. The purpose of in-kind fines is to ensure full performance of grain procurement plans.

3. To immediately collect seed grain and foodstuff loans given to private farmers by collective farms in their raions without recourse for appeal; in cases where loans issued to private farmers were repaid by collective farms (in Vinnytsia oblast, for example), the loans shall be collected from the private farmers and credited to the collective farms’ grain procurement targets.  

4. Organize brigades consisting of collective farm activists (from a given village or those in the area) from collective farms that have fully performed their grain procurement plans, or are on the verge of doing so, to assist in the full performance of grain procurement plans by the private farming sector.

Organize, by December 1, at least 1,100 of these collective farmer brigades throughout Ukraine, according to the following oblasts and numbers:

Vinnytsia         -200     Kyiv                            -300

Chernihiv        -100     Kharkiv                       -350

Odesa              -  50     Dnipropetrovsk           -  50

Donbas            -  50

5. Private farmers who have conscientiously performed their grain procurement duties, especially those who have done so ahead of schedule, shall be recognized by resolutions of village executive committees, assistance commissions, etc., and shall be included in the grain procurement brigades, assistance commissions and so forth.

6. Kulaks who have failed to deliver grain shall be subject to repressions provided by Article 58 of the Criminal Code, either through judicial or administrative proceedings. [...]

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, p. 22-24)

- Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 24 December 1932 on the mandatory shipment of all collective farm grain reserves, including sowing seed, to complete the grain procurement plan.
To: Secretaries of Party raion and oblast committees, persons deputized by CP(b)U

December 24, 1932

In accordance with the cancellation of the CC CP(b)U resolution from November 18 concerning kolhosp inventories, we propose:

1. All collective farms that failed to perform grain procurement plans have five days to ship, without exception, all kolhosp reserves, including sowing seeds, to fulfill grain procurement quotas.

2. Everyone resisting this measure, including communists, shall be arrested and tried.

3. Warn all collective farm heads that if any hidden reserves, stores and the like are found after the set date, then the chairman, and other guilty parties will be brought before the courts and severely punished. 

4. Order all raion Party council secretaries, chairmen of raion executive committees and persons authorized by oblast committees to deliver this resolution for signing by the heads of collective farms in 24 hours’ time.

Kosior

Stroganov

Alekseiev


(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 32)

-Letter from Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 29 December 1932 to oblast and raion Party committees on collecting all available reserves for grain procurement.
December 29, 1932

Raion workers have not yet understood that the #1 priority for grain procurement in those collective farms that have failed to perform their duty before the state is the submission of all available seed, including so-called sowing reserves, towards the grain procurement plan.

Accordingly, the CC AUCP(b) has canceled the CC CP(b)U’s decision from November 18 on non-shipment of seed reserves that had weakened our positions in the battle for grain.

The CC CP(b)U orders those collective farms that have not fulfilled the grain procurement plan to immediately hand over all available reserves, including so-called sowing seed, in the course of five to six days, for the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan.

Towards this end, the CC orders the immediate mobilization of all transport vehicles, working animals, automobiles and tractors. In one day’s time, orders should be issued for the daily provision of the necessary number of horses, including for private farmers.

Any delays in the sending out of reserves will be considered by the CC to be sabotage of grain procurement by raion leaders and will be met with commensurate measures. 

Secretary CC CP(b)U S. Kosior
(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 34)

-Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 1 January 1933 on grain procurement in Ukraine (excerpt).

1 January 1933 
The CC CP(B)U and CPC UkrSSR shall widely inform village councils, collective farms, collective farmers, and toiling private farmers that.... 
b) Those collective farms, collective farmers, and private farmers who stubbornly inisst on misappropriating and concealing grain will be subject to the strictest punitive measures provided by the USSR Central Executive Committee resolution of  7 August 1932 “On the safekeeping of property of state enterprises, collective farms, and cooperatives and strengthening public (socialist) property.” 
Secretary, CC AUCP(B), J. Stalin
(Document reproduced in https://holodomor.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/6.HolodomorDocuments-MY.docx.pdf, p. 28)

-Report from the Voroshilov Party committee to the Donetsk oblast committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of 4 January 1933 on blacklisting the kolhosp in Horodyshche for the systematic non-performance of grain procurement plans.

January 4, 1933

Horodyshche village is the largest in Voroshylov raion with more than 1,000 farms, mostly staroveri [old believers] for whom farming has always been a supplementary source of income as the overwhelming majority of homesteads have been traditionally engaged in trade. This village was found to host the largest kulak community.

Thus, the political campaign measures in Horodyshche were implemented with great difficulty and encountered active resistance from most of the population. In addition to the malicious sabotage of Soviet government efforts, groups of bandits, horse thieves, and the like used to live and hide in this village during the civil war.

Over the years, the Horodyshche village has never fulfilled grain procurement plans.

The persistent neglect of activities conducted in the village by Party and Soviet authorities, cover-ups and familial relationships with dekulakized village leaders are well-preserved to this day, despite the three-year existence of the collective farm that includes most of the people in the village.

In 1931, the grain procurement plan was 10,000 centners [100 kilograms] for a grain crop sowing area of 4,647 hectares; it was 64 percent performed, whereas the plan for the [entire] raion was performed 105 percent.

The 1932 plan of 6.5 thousand centners was 23.9 percent performed as of January 2.

In the two months since the collective farm has been blacklisted (November and December), 373 centners, or 5.6 percent of the annual plan, were delivered to the state, including 83 centners of re-threshed grain, 63 centners of what was obtained illegally by farmers and 6 centners of stolen [grain]. [. . .]

A thorough investigation revealed that the trade ban did not produce the desired effect, because the population, acting through family members and relatives who work in industry, continued consuming goods from the workers’ cooperative, factory and village outlets.

Agricultural products are being secretly carried away for sale by, mostly to Debaltsevo station. Horodyshche farmers have 365 cows, 62 heifers, 56 horses, 10 pairs of oxen (in addition to small livestock), 100 hectares of home garden plots, 28 hectares of orchards that provide large incomes for these farms through the sale of agricultural products at the stations that are located relatively close by.

The following measures were used:

1. In addition to the closing of village stores and Donbastorh [Donbas trade network], strict and closed-list distribution of goods was introduced to the coal miners’ and collective farm workers’ cooperatives. One thousand and twenty family members of collective and private farmers engaged in industrial production were taken off the supply list.

2. Credits in the amount of 23,547 rubles were collected ahead of their scheduled repayment.

3. Three MTS [machine tractor station] tractors were seized from the collective farm.

4. An investigation into collective farm personnel was conducted resulting in the purging of 58 persons (3 kulaks, 22 kulak relatives, 32 thieves, slackers, speculators and kulak supporters). This group, which sought to demoralize the collective farm and organized resistance, was expelled at a meeting of collective farm worker teams with the support of the collective farm majority.

5. Forty-three kulak families that had fled their previous place of residence in Horodyshche were returned to the kulak settlement in the raion.

6. The leadership of the collective farm was put on trial. The investigation uncovered serious abuses. The case is now before the oblast court, where it was submitted on December 23. No response has thus far been received.

7. The collective farm’s sowing seed reserves of 356 centners were requisitioned for the grain procurement campaign.

All these measures were implemented in combination with organized work with the public and the participation of the best the collective farm activists in the grain procurement campaign.

A city Party committee team of 10 leading raion activists is working in the collective farm.

In order to deliver a decisive blow to chronic sabotage by kulaks in Horodyshche, we ask the Party oblast committee to authorize the following additional repressive measures for the Horodyshche village collective farm:

1. Levy 15-month meat quota fines upon collective and private farmers.

2. Assign the best plots of the spare 1,300 hectares of land available to the collective farm to coal-mine food producers, as repressions.

3. Dismiss at least 150 Horodyshche village residents from [industrial] operations for taking active part in the sabotage and derailment of the grain procurement campaign under the guise of industrial laborers after discussing the list of those to be dismissed with collective farm organizations and members.

4. Issue a warning to the collective farm and residents of Horodyshche: If the sabotage of grain procurement and the hiding of stolen grain continue, city organizations will ask the government to resettle saboteurs to the northern oblasts and bring in conscientious collective farmers from city suburbs to take their place; the houses of collective farmers in villages situated near industrial sites will be made available to industrial laborers in need of accommodations.

5. Request the speedy dispatch of oblast court personnel in the case of the Horodyshche collective farm leadership.

Secretary, CP(b)U Voroshylov city committee, Kholokholenko

Commissioner of the oblast committee, Lyrev

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 36-37)

-Act of 1 February 1933 drawn up by the brigade of the Zamistyanska village council of the Valkiv district stating that as a result of a search of a peasant ZA A pit was opened, from which up to 3.5 pounds of rye, up to 2 pounds of beans and up to 2 pounds of dried pears were removed and confiscated. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/docs.php?pagep=2&doc=195)

-Complaint from Hanna Derevinskaya, Krasnopillya, to the Dnipropetrovsk city council of 26 February 1933 about the requisition of food for grain procurement. 

February 26, 1933

To the City Council of Dnipropetrovsk oblast

from Citizen Derevinskaya, Hanna,

Krasnopillya

STATEMENT

Please consider my statement on the unruly work of brigades dispatched by the village council and the representative of the Petrovsky factory.

On February 10, a grain procurement brigade came to me and asked that I voluntarily give what beans I could.  From what I had left to feed the family I gave three kilograms but they took it all (40 kilograms).

On February 23, another brigade made up of the same group came and requested potatoes which I received for labor in workers’ gardens on days off for a family of four which works at the Petrovsky factory; the potatoes received from the cooperative were only for feeding our families. Despite the fact that the potatoes were issued by the state and equally among the other workers who worked in the gardens, including the head of the Petrovsky factory brigade, they did not realize that they’re undermining spring sowing in the workers’ gardens. Acting on their own, they took 125 kilograms of potatoes and 38 kilograms of beets from the cellar. I have fulfilled the entire grain procurement farming quota. I ask your assistance in returning the confiscated food issued by the cooperative.

Appellant Derevinskaya 26.II.1933

(Document reproduced in Pyrih, Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials, p. 45)

Contemporary Photographs

-Photograph of Komsomols confiscating grain allegedly hidden by kulaks. (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RIAN_archive_79113_Seizing_grain_from_kulaks.jpg)

-Photograph in November 1932 of Soviet soldiers confiscating large amounts of crops from farmers in Odessa, Ukraine. (https://allthatsinteresting.com/holodomor-ukrainian-famine#7)

-Photograph of a brigade of men with grain confiscated from a nearby house. (https://education.holodomor.ca/educational-resources-list/photo-gallery/historical-photographs-of-the-holodomor-2/)

-Photograph in October 1932 of Soviet authorities confiscating grain from a family in Novokrasne. (http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/24/let-me-take-the-wife-too-when-i-reach-the-cemetery-she-will-be-dead-stories-of-holodomor-survivors/)

-Photograph of Soviet authorities searching for peasant bread. (http://www.golodomor.kharkov.ua/gallery.php?pagep=2)

-Photograph of mass grain confiscation in front of a home in the Baryshivka district, Kyiv region. (http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pic%5CG%5CR%5CGrain%20requisition%20in%20Baryshivka%20district%201930.jpg)

-Photograph of a brigade of men searching for "hidden grain". (https://education.holodomor.ca/educational-resources-list/photo-gallery/historical-photographs-of-the-holodomor-2/)





Data on the amount of people convicted by the troikas of Ukraine from 19 September, 1937 to 29 October, 1937 (Reference of the 1st Special Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR dated October 31, 1938)

From September 19, 1937 to October 29, 1937, the Special Troikas of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR convicted a total of 30,031 people for ant...